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Abstract 
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examines the economic impact of Hurricane Katrina on professional sports in New Orleans and 
traces the recovery of the city in conjunction with spectator sports. 
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I. Introduction1 
 Hurricane Katrina devastated New Orleans physically and economically after 
making landfall on August 29, 2005.  Full recovery, which generally follows natural 
catastrophes in the United States given the inflow of funds for reconstruction, seemed 
less certain in the Crescent City.  Citizens and businesses that left New Orleans following 
the storm exhibited a reluctance to return, and in many ways, the city has yet to fully 
recover from the devastation of the event even over a decade later.  The city’s 
professional sports teams were among those enterprises that departed New Orleans in the 
wake of Hurricane Katrina.  The National Football League (NFL) Saints played home 
games in three different cities (San Antonio, Baton Rouge, and New York City) during 
2005.  The National Basketball Association (NBA) Hornets took up residence in 
Oklahoma City for 35 of their 41 home games during the 2005-2006 season, returning to 
Louisiana (although playing in Baton Rouge and not New Orleans) for a largely symbolic 
six games. The Arena Football League’s Voodoo abandoned their entire 2006 schedule. 
The University of New Orleans and Tulane, both National Collegiate Athletic 
Association (NCAA) Division 1 schools, either cancelled entire seasons for individual 
sports or played “barnstorming” seasons with no home games. 
  When we first conducted this analysis, we focused on two questions:  what was 
and is the future of professional and spectator sports in New Orleans, and what roles did 
sports play and continue to play in the economic redevelopment of the city? The purpose 
of this paper is to analyze the extent to which the city of New Orleans directed its 
                                                 
1 Significant portions of this paper originally appeared as Robert Baade and Victor Matheson, “Professional 
Sports, Hurricane Katrina, and the Economic Redevelopment of New Orleans,” Contemporary Economic 
Policy, Vol. 25:4, (October 2007), 591-603. The paper has been updated to reflect the economic 
redevelopment of New Orleans and the role of sports in the city’s recovery over the past decade. 
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redevelopment dollars toward its sports infrastructure and to ask whether New Orleans 
benefited economically from its role as host to major professional sports teams and a 
disproportionate number of mega-sports events given its size and demographics. Did 
commercial sports enable a rebuilding of New Orleans’s storm-ravaged infrastructure or 
did it force civic trade-offs made even more painful by the storm? 
Independent scholarship in general has not supported the thesis that professional 
sports induce significant increases in economic activity for host cities.  New Orleans, 
however, may be different.  The city is smaller and less affluent than other host cities in 
general, and it may be that the frequency with which large sports events are hosted by 
New Orleans makes the area an exception to the experience of most cities with regard to 
sports and economic development.  The gravity of the city’s economic situation in the 
wake of Katrina necessitates an individual and more complete appraisal as the strategies 
for economic redevelopment are evaluated thirteen years after the storm. Answers to the 
questions raised in this introduction require a review of, among other things, New 
Orleans’ place in the national professional sports landscape, the extent of the damage 
Katrina wrought, the amount of redevelopment money the city must commit, and the 
evidence with regard to the impact sports has on host city economies with special 
attention to the circumstances that surrounded New Orleans in its rebuilding period. 
 
II. New Orleans Prior to Katrina 
While New Orleans hosts major league franchises in both the NFL and NBA, with 
a pre-hurricane metropolitan area population of less than 1.6 million residents, the city 
was already a small market for any of the major sports leagues in the U.S. As shown in 
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Table 1, in 2004 New Orleans was the 37st largest metropolitan area in the United States 
by population and was the 35th largest city out of the 39 hosting a team from one of the 
five large professional sports leagues in country.   
The situation became markedly worse in the following decade. Katrina caused a 
significant dislocation of the city’s residents resulting in the New Orleans metropolitan 
area suffering the largest percentage drop in population among large American cities 
between 2004 and 2016. As seen in Table 1, by 2016 New Orleans had dropped to the 
41st largest metropolitan area in the US and was the 36th largest city out of 40 “Major 
League” cities. Furthermore, four metro areas in the country without any major sports 
franchises, Austin, Virginia Beach/Norfolk, Greensboro, and Louisville, are all larger 
than New Orleans. Another sixteen larger cities are without an NBA team, including 
several with strong ambitions to attract a franchise such as Kansas City and St. Louis. 
Fifteen cities without an NFL franchise have larger population bases than New Orleans, 
including St. Louis and San Diego, both of which recently lost franchises to Los Angeles, 
and football hungry San Antonio, which played host to the New Orleans Saints for three 
of their “home” games during the 2005 season. Not only is New Orleans small, but it is 
also relatively poor ranking 35th in per capita personal income among the cities listed in 
Table 2 and 32nd out of the 40 cities with major professional sports franchises. To be fair, 
however, the city is relatively richer now than in 2004 when it ranked 47th out of the 48 
largest US cities in per capita income. Many of the city’s poorest residents who were 
displaced by Katrina did not return. 
Another strike against New Orleans is its business climate, as corporations play a 
major role in keeping a team financially competitive.  It is one thing to provide highly 
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profitable luxury seating; it is another to fill those seats. The city is home to just two 
Fortune 500 companies: CenturyLink, ranked 168 in 2018, and Entergy, ranked 241th, 
and there is, therefore, not the market for loges and club seats that can be found in the 
other NBA and NFL cities with which New Orleans competes.  One writer somewhat 
whimsically stated the NFL financial equation in the following way: 
Instead of fans, the NFL seeks corporations...While the NBA and Major 
League Baseball have guaranteed contracts for their players, the NFL with 
its exorbitant TV rights deals and corporate backing has practically given 
their owners guaranteed dollars… 
 
The way business is done now is the owner convinces his buddies who 
own the largest businesses in their respective cities to buy majority (sic) of 
the season tickets and luxury boxes. The result: a term exclusive to the 
NFL, the guaranteed sellout. Saints owner Tom Benson can’t do that in 
New Orleans because there are no major corporations other than Entergy 
to back him. (Terrebonne Parrish Courier, 2005) 
 
The competition to host a professional sports team is often as fierce as the 
competition among athletes on game day, and the lack of population base and both 
personal and corporate wealth places New Orleans at a considerable disadvantage in 
supporting and, therefore, retaining either the Saints or the Hornets.  Prior to Hurricane 
Katrina, in fact, New Orleans appeared to be on the verge of losing its NFL franchise. 
Tom Benson, the owner of the Saints at the time, had reportedly rejected the state’s final 
offer to keep the Saints in New Orleans in late April of 2005. (Benson died in March 
2018 at which time his wife took over control of the team. (Underhill, 2018)) The state’s 
offer included not only public financing of over 75 percent of a proposed $174 million 
Superdome2 renovation, but also direct cash payments to the Saints totaling $64 million 
through 2008 and $9.5 million per year after the completion of the renovations to the 
                                                 
2 The Superdome, opened in 1975, is the home field for the NFL’s New Orleans Saints and has also served 
as the home field for the Tulane University football team in the past. It is now known as the Mercedes-
Benz Superdome.  
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Superdome in 2008 (USA Today, 2005). The state’s offer to the Saints, including the 
annual cash subsidy, would have placed the team in the top half of the financial standings 
in the NFL.  
The fact that Benson would reject such an offer, which included a direct cash 
subsidy to the team, speaks volumes about the financial realities of the NFL and the 
inordinate transfer of business risk from teams to their host cities.  While the state 
struggled to meet its contractual cash payments to the team in the wake of reduced tax 
revenues following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the only significant 
financial risk facing Tom Benson was the $81 million he would have been required to 
pay (representing the subsidies that the Saints have received since 2001), if he broke his 
Superdome contract, which he could have done following the 2006 season (Konigsmark, 
2005). That risk pales in comparison to the $1 billion written offer Benson claims to have 
received for the team in 2005, a 1,400 percent increase over the $70 million price Benson 
paid for the Saints in 1985 (Robinson, 2005).  The lucrative offer Benson received for the 
team reflects at least in part the money-making potential of NFL teams, which is 
explained in large part by the subsidies cities extend to attract a supply of teams that is 
limited by the NFL and its owners. The value of the Saints has only risen since 2005. 
Forbes estimates that the franchise was valued at $2 billion in 2017. (Forbes, 2017) 
While recognizing New Orleans’ shortcomings as it relates to its ability to host 
professional sports, on the other side of the coin, the city caters to the tourist trade to an 
extent that distinguishes itself from almost every other American city.  The infrastructure 
that New Orleans has created arguably provides a comparative advantage in hosting 
events to include commercial sports over most cities in the United States. The city’s 
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performance in attracting outside events supports the idea that it has exercised its 
comparative advantage.  Even though New Orleans is a relatively small city, it ranked 
fifth in the United States in the number of conventions hosted (Tennessean News 
Services, 2005).  Prior to the storm New Orleans annually attracted more than 10 million 
visitors who spent in excess of $5 billion per year according to the New Orleans 
Metropolitan and Tourism Bureau.   
The information recorded in Tables 3 and 4 in a general sense indicates the extent 
to which New Orleans is geared to tourism.  The fraction of the New Orleans economy 
both before and after Katrina that was accounted for by “Leisure and Hospitality” [North 
American Industrial Classification System (NAICS) 7] in 2004 indicated that New 
Orleans had a significantly larger tourist component than did the United States overall 
and most other southern cities in the U.S. that hosted NBA or NFL teams.  It is 
noteworthy that New Orleans tourist sector as measured by employees and payroll in 
NAICS 7 is roughly 25 percent larger than that of Miami, Florida, which is among the 
most tourist-friendly cities in the country, and trails only Orlando, home of Disneyworld.  
Commercial sport, of course, is one important aspect of the tourist/leisure 
industry, and it could have played a role in the economic revitalization of New Orleans.  
Since opening in 1975, the Superdome has hosted numerous sporting events of national 
significance including the NFL’s Super Bowl in 1978, 1981, 1986, 1990, 1997, 2002, and 
2013 (Holder, 2018) and the National Intercollegiate Athletic Association Men’s 
Basketball Final Four in 1982, 1987, 1993, and 2003.  Furthermore, the Superdome 
annually hosts the Sugar Bowl, one of college football’s top post-season matches and a 
game which has determined college football’s national champion nine times since 1975. 
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Post-Katrina, New Orleans has continued to host numerous mega-events such as the 2013 
Super Bowl, the 2012 NCAA Men’s Basketball Final Four, and the 2007 and 2012 
College Football National Championship game. 
 Replacing the infrastructure for professional sports and mega-sports events can be 
justified if the benefits provided by the facilities exceed the costs incurred in the 
reconstruction.  Both costs and benefits have to be measured over time since the facilities 
provided a stream of benefits as well as generating costs associated with operations and 
maintenance (O&M).  Comprehensive economic analysis would include not only the 
explicit benefits but also the implicit benefits and costs, which are difficult not only to 
measure but in many cases to identify.   
 Data do exist for New Orleans for the number of establishments, annual payroll, 
and number of employees for a variety of entertainment related industries defined 
according to the NAICS and these data are recorded in Table 5.  
 All data point to the fact that the economic activity accounted for through the 
“Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation” industry (NAICS 71) for New Orleans is 
absolutely small, but large when compared to the United States overall.  Census data, 
thus, supports the idea that New Orleans is a tourist-based economy that exhibits an arts-
entertainment-recreation industry that is larger than that characterizing the United States 
as a whole.   
The contribution of “Spectator Sports” (NAICS 7112), however, is less than 1 
percent by any of the measures identified in Table 3. Despite the high salaries paid 
professional athletes, the spectator sports industry typically accounts for less than 1 
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percent of a city’s payroll, and, by that measure, the industry is not economically vital to 
cities in the United States in general to include New Orleans. 
Numerous studies of both professional sports franchises and stadiums as well as 
of mega-events, furthermore, lend support to the notion that sports have little impact on 
local economies.  Analyses of the Super Bowl (Baade and Matheson, 2006; Porter, 1999), 
NCAA Final Four (Baade and Matheson, 2004), and mega-events in general (Coates and 
Humphreys, 2002; Baade, Baumann, and Matheson, 2007), for example, have all 
concluded that these big sporting events have no statistically significant impact on any 
number of economic variables such as employment, per capita income, metropolitan 
area-wide gross domestic product, or taxable sales.  Coates and Depken (2006) indicated 
ambivalence about the economic contribution of sports mega-events concluding, “The 
upshot is, therefore, that these mega-events are not necessarily the economic windfall that 
their proponents portray them to be.”  Stadiums and professional franchises (Baade and 
Dye, 1990; Coates and Humphreys, 1999; Baade, Baumann, and Matheson, 2007) 
similarly show little in the way of economic benefits for host cities. 
Given the economically tenuous state of professional sports in New Orleans prior 
to Hurricane Katrina, it is difficult to imagine that a disaster of its magnitude would 
improve to prospects for the industry in the city.  The next section of the paper 
summarizes the extent of the damage with a particular emphasis on the demographic 
changes that may be sufficiently long-lived to have adversely influenced the prospects for 
supporting professional sports in New Orleans in the long term.    
 
III. Measuring Katrina’s Devastation  
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 Hurricane Katrina, which swept into New Orleans and the Gulf Coast on August 
29, 2005, caused far and away the largest damages in real dollar terms of any hurricane in 
U.S. history, with uninsured losses topping $100 billion (Bloomberg News, 2005) and 
insured losses estimated at $34.4 billion (Powell, 2005). Its final death toll of over 1,400 
also places it among the worst natural disasters ever suffered by the United States. New 
Orleans was particularly hard hit by the storm, as flood waters remained for weeks after 
Katrina while levies were repaired, and rebuilding the city was an epic undertaking 
unmatched in scope and expense in recent U.S. history.  
The cost of reconstructing New Orleans itself has been placed at more than $100 
billion dollars (Tennessean News Service, 2005).  Approximately 80 percent of New 
Orleans’ 188,000 occupied housing units were severely damaged by the storm.  
Furthermore, more than half of the city’s 100,000 owner-occupied homes were built 
before 1950, and their repair and replacement will require expensive modifications to 
meet modern building codes designed to prevent future hurricane damage (Tennessean 
News Service, 2005).  
 The damage to middle class neighborhoods has substantial implications for the 
redevelopment effort both as it relates to production and consumption.  Without a middle 
class, New Orleans will not have the workers it needs to run the economy that existed 
prior to Katrina, and the spending necessary to restore the economy to pre-hurricane 
levels will be deficient.  Katrina devastated the housing stock, schools, and other 
infrastructure vital to normal life for all socio-economic classes. 
 The extent of the damage to the social infrastructure must also be carefully 
assessed since the return of middle class workers and consumers is essential to the 
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revitalization of the New Orleans economy. Even before Katrina, by nearly every 
measure of economic development, New Orleans lagged behind other large American 
cities. Labor force participation rates and employment to population ratios in New 
Orleans averaged 5 to 10 percent below national levels for most demographic groups 
(Gabe, et al., 2005). Hurricane damaged areas in Louisiana had poverty rates above the 
national average (21.4% vs. 12.4%), and New Orleans residents were less likely (55% vs. 
66%) to live in owner-occupied housing than residents of other large cities (Gabe, et al., 
2005).  Finally, the educational attainment of younger adults (age 18 to 34) for storm-
damaged areas was generally below that for the rest of the nation. For example, 22.9 
percent of young adults in hurricane damaged areas had not completed a high school 
degree compared with 20.6 percent nationwide, while only 22.5 percent had completed a 
college degree compared with 29.3 percent nationwide (Gabe, et al., 2005). 
 These figures had several implications for the likelihood that displaced people 
would return.  First, Katrina hit the economically disadvantaged hardest.  Statistics 
indicate that other places in the nation to which they have relocated improved their 
opportunities for employment.  Second, significant portions of the middle class were 
displaced in the storm-ravaged area; 47.4 percent of those displaced had education 
equivalent to some college or above (Gabe, et al., 2005).  Third, 45 percent of those 
displaced did not live in homes that they owned indicating that a significant portion of the 
people displaced by Hurricane Katrina had weak financial ties to the communities they 
abandoned.  A significant permanent displacement of the population affected by the 
storm undermined or may have substantially altered the socio-demographic character of 
neighborhoods mostly adversely affected by the storm.  It should also be noted that 
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virtually entire neighborhoods and parishes were wiped out by the storm, and devastation 
of that magnitude may well negate any pull that community loyalty and ties may exert in 
bringing people back. It has been estimated, for example, that Orleans Parish and St. 
Bernard Parish lost 65.9 and 89.8 percent of their populations over the period October 
2005 to January 2006 (Greater New Orleans Community Data Center, 2005).  Even if 
people were inclined to return, much of the infrastructure necessary to rebuild and sustain 
people had been eliminated.  Government programs, furthermore, were unable to fully 
compensate for lost private infrastructure.   
            
IV.  The Economy of New Orleans Post-Katrina and the Sports Industry 
The New Orleans economy served the nation as a tourist center and transportation 
hub for water transport in particular as previously noted, and therefore, any economic 
redevelopment effort should focus on those industries, an opinion endorsed by members 
of an ad hoc committee of urban experts assembled under the auspices of the Urban Land 
Institute.  The information in Table 6, to be specific, indicates that in July 2005, 32.9 
percent of the labor force in New Orleans was employed in the “Trade and 
Transportation” and “Leisure and Hospitality” sectors.  The numbers recorded in Table 6 
indicate several things worthy of note as it relates to characterizing the New Orleans 
economy pre- and post-Katrina.  First, the transportation/trade and leisure/hospitality 
industries, the cornerstones of the New Orleans economy, did recover to some extent. 
Employment in the transportation and trade sector remain below their pre-Katrina levels, 
but the numbers employed in the leisure and hospitality sector have fully recovered and 
now exceed their pre-Katrina levels by a modest amount.  
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Hurricane Katrina led to a significant temporary contraction of the leisure 
industry. In the immediate aftermath of the storm there were fewer people flying into 
New Orleans in comparison to pre-Katrina levels, and a smaller number of 
establishments to accommodate them.  Nearly one year after Katrina, the number of retail 
food establishments was 44 percent of the level prior to the storm, and the number of 
hotels open remained below the pre-Katrina level.   
Even now over a decade after the storm New Orleans has not fully returned to the 
population and economic activity levels that existed prior to the storm, although tourism 
appears to be a fairly bright spot overall. There is compelling scholarship by Davis and 
Weinstein (2002) to suggest that population and economic activity across cities and 
regions within a country are not random occurrences, but rather reflect “locational 
fundamentals,” e.g., location on a coast or significant river (physical geography), and 
economies of scale emanating from “economic clustering.”  The Davis and Weinstein 
study is based on 8,000 years of data on Japanese regions, and Japan’s population is far 
more homogenous than that characterizing the United States.  The population of New 
Orleans is particularly diverse.   
Other scholarship supports the importance of locational fundamentals in 
explaining developments relating to population movements following catastrophic 
events.  Evidence following the Chicago Fire of 1871, indicates that the City’s recovery 
from that event depended on location fundamentals specific to neighborhoods (Macaulay, 
2005).  More recently, economic recovery from the 1992 Rodney King riots in Los 
Angeles was notably slow as compared to Miami’s experience following the devastation 
of Hurricane Andrew in the same year (Baade and Matheson, 2004; Baade, Baumann, 
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and Matheson, 2007). Taken together, these findings suggest that heterogeneity as it 
relates in part to ethnicity, shared values and culture, income and wealth, and education 
can retard redevelopment and efforts to resettle.  Many New Orleans neighborhoods 
where redevelopment has been slow to occur exhibit marked variation in these 
characteristics and relatively low rates of home ownership as previously mentioned.  
 So, what role did spectator sports play in the economy of New Orleans as it 
attempted to recover from Hurricane Katrina’s devastation? First, it is important to note 
that the Superdome itself, which served an ill-fated role as a center for 30,000 refugees 
who were unable to escape the city prior to the storm, suffered extensive damage due to 
Katrina as did other sports facilities throughout the city. In the immediate aftermath of 
the storm, immediate decisions needed to be made as to the extent of repairs that the city 
would undertake. Following any emergency repairs, additional consideration would be 
given towards long-term upgrades to the facility. Finally, the city needed to decide the 
extent to which it would make direct subsidies available to the city’s professional sports 
teams in order to have the return to and remain in the city.  
The extent of the devastation caused by Katrina coupled with the demographic 
character of New Orleans prior to the storm led to the prospect that residents of the city 
would resettle elsewhere in the country.  The likelihood that New Orleans would return to 
its pre-Katrina state, in turn, clearly had a bearing on probability that professional sports 
teams would be able to remain in the city for the long-term.  If the chances increased that 
pro-sport teams will eventually leave due to a lack of fan support that had implications 
for the efficacy of substantial public investments to replace or repair the professional 
sports infrastructure.   
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Following Katrina, plans for completely replacing the Superdome were scuttled, 
and instead, the city embarked on a multi-stage and multi-hundred million-dollar repair 
and renovation of the Superdome. The first stage involved repair of the direct wind and 
water damage caused to the facility by the Hurricane as well and the deterioration of the 
stadium caused by its use an emergency shelter. These repairs cost roughly $200 million 
and were finished in time for the Saints to open their season back in New Orleans on 
September 25, 2006, just over a year after Katrina. An extensive set of renovations was 
then undertaken including new or refurbished seats, new club facilities and luxury suites, 
expanded bathrooms, new scoreboards and video systems, and a doubling of the locker 
room space. This phase was completed for the opening of the 2011 NFL season. The total 
cost of these two phases of construction cost a reported $336 million, of which $156 
million was paid for by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). 
(Associated Press, 2011) While the NFL as a league pledged $20 million towards these 
repairs, Saints owner Tom Benson, the primary tenant of the facility, paid nothing 
towards its reconstruction. Louisiana had only a $500 million insurance policy on state 
buildings along with $100 million in flood insurance, and the Superdome was just one of 
the many public buildings including schools damaged by the storm, so some have 
questioned the priority placed on this facility (Corbett, 2006).   
Paradoxically, the extent of the devastation and the significant pressure exerted on 
the public sector to demonstrate its resolve and ability to help the city recover enhanced 
the prospects that those edifices most representative of the city to the outside world 
would be restored.  Delaney and Eckstein (2003) identified the strength of “local growth 
coalitions” as vital to understanding public choices regarding the construction of sports 
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infrastructure.  The public choice theory detailed by Delaney and Eckstein helps explain 
decision making in New Orleans with regard to the rapid reconstruction of the 
Superdome, and the successful floating of the $294-million bond issue that financed the 
repair.  Not only was there a strong local growth coalition following Katrina, but that 
local effort was bolstered by a strong national sentiment for helping New Orleans get 
back on its feet.  Ironically, the ineptitude that government displayed arguably at all 
levels immediately following the storm increased the pressure on government to correct 
the negative perceptions about its performance.  Louisiana Governor Kathleen Babineaux 
Blanco in announcing the bond sale remarked that, “Rebuilding and reopening the 
Superdome were critical steps in Louisiana’s recovery from hurricanes Katrina and Rita 
and this bond sale made them possible.” (New Orleans City Business, 2006) The 
Superdome as a symbol of the city’s ability to survive and its struggle to recover 
achieved particular significance as Katrina’s impact played out.  
The demand for the Saints, the primary tenant of the Superdome, had been given a 
boost by the increase in the political demand for the Superdome.  The political resistance 
for public subsidies to keep the Saints from marching elsewhere eased, and the successful 
sale of the bonds to repair and renovate the Superdome corroborates that assertion.  The 
NFL, furthermore, had to temper Tom Benson’s desire to move the franchise to keep the 
League’s image from being tarnished further by widely criticized franchise moves from 
Los Angeles to St. Louis and Oakland and from Cleveland to Baltimore.  Indeed, many 
observers believe that the Saints would certainly have ended up in the greener fields of 
Los Angeles within a few years after 2005 had Hurricane Katrina not occurred. The 
“good-cop” role played by the NFL in keeping the Saints in New Orleans may well have 
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facilitated financial transfers to Tom Benson from a grateful City.  All in all, in a peculiar 
way, financial transfers to Tom Benson had been made easier as a consequence of the 
storm. 
 Once again the efficacy of those transfers can be questioned.  Given the very 
small percentage of economic activity in New Orleans accounted for by the sports 
industry, it may have not been prudent to devote a disproportionate share of scarce 
redevelopment funds to that sector.  An even stronger argument can be made against 
refurbishing the Superdome to accommodate the financial needs of the NFL Saints since 
their owner had consistently sought economic concessions from a city and state that were 
financially stressed even prior to Katrina. In 2001, Saints’ owner Tom Benson signed an 
agreement that required the City to pay him $186 million over the next 10 years in 
exchange for the “privilege” of having the team play in the Superdome. A fifteen-year 
extension to this agreement signed in 2011 guaranteed the Saints’ owner an additional 
$392 million in revenues through taxpayer subsidies through 2025. (Alexander, 2013) 
The economic incentive for the Saints owner to keep the team in New Orleans 
was compromised by Katrina.  As the small economy of New Orleans lacked the 
financial wherewithal to support professional sports in the same manner as other cities, 
especially following Katrina, the Saints increasingly turned to public subsidies to 
generate revenues for its billionaire owner. Furthermore, unlike the efforts made by large 
oil companies and small business alike to repair the capital-intensive oil refineries as well 
as small restaurants and shops in and around the city, there existed little motivation for 
the Saints to recoup their small investment in infrastructure. This points to a larger 
problem with the financial structure of the professional sports industry throughout the 
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United States.  Namely, the existence of substantial subsidies for infrastructure 
undermines a team’s commitment to its host city. Absent any meaningful risk to their 
own capital, what incentive does a team have to stay in a city that experiences a 
catastrophe on the scale of Hurricane Katrina if the team has little in the way of 
permanent infrastructure invested in its host city? There is little question that in the vast 
majority of cases the financial risk accompanying hosting professional sports in the 
United States is disproportionately borne by the host community.  Katrina provided 
striking testimony to the reality of how subsidies for sports infrastructure have 
contributed to that financial vulnerability. 
Consumer spending on spectator sports by local residents probably also serves to 
slow down the recovery of the local economy after a natural disaster. The money spent on 
attending a sports event by residents of the home-team community necessarily precludes 
them from spending that money on other locally owned and operated entertainment.  
Furthermore, local expenditures on professional sports may actually reduce total 
spending in the economy as opposed to simply reallocating money among competing 
ends. Professional sports, which use national resource markets as opposed to locally 
owned and operated resources for alternative entertainment or recreational activities, may 
foster a net outflow of money.  Most of the money spent on a night at a professional 
sports event goes to the athletes and owners of the team who may not live in the 
community in which they play.  Siegfried and Zimbalist (2002) note that while 93% of 
average employees live in the area where they work, only 29% of NBA players do the 
same (and the figures are likely to be similar in the NFL and other major leagues).  Given 
the generally poor condition of the city following Katrina, it is even less likely that 
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millionaire athletes, and those with the financial wherewithal to live elsewhere, chose to 
reside in the Big Easy in the immediate aftermath of the hurricane.  Certainly, owner 
Tom Benson, who had business interests in San Antonio among other cities, showed little 
interest in spending money in the city.  
Furthermore, the devastation of the middle and lower classes in New Orleans 
eliminated not just the customers, but also the labor upon which professional sports 
relies. Each large event at the Superdome requires approximately 2,500 part-time 
workers. Unfortunately, the lack of housing in New Orleans meant that no such pool of 
potential part-time workers was readily available in the city. Indeed, good fraction of the 
workers at the facility will very likely have to come from outside the city.  The leakage of 
money from New Orleans through athletes repatriating their incomes to their primary 
residences were further enhanced by ordinary workers doing the same thing in some 
appreciable amount because of a lack of housing in many New Orleans neighborhoods.  
Post-Katrina, it was even less likely that income generated through commercial sports 
activities remained in the city. 
The prospect of hosting mega-events was perhaps a more important incentive in 
repairing the city’s sports infrastructure. As noted previously, the city was a frequent 
destination for major sporting events such as the Super Bowl or college bowl games. 
Mega-events have the economic advantage over hosting professional franchises in that 
much of the spending comes from outside the region. Most spectators at regular season 
home games are local residents and their spending at an event does not represent new 
spending in the region but rather simply reallocates where economic activity occurs in the 
metropolitan area. A football team’s gain may represent a loss for a local restaurant or 
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music club where the local resident would have spent their entertainment dollars in the 
absence of a professional sports franchise. On the other hand, attendees at a mega-event 
are typically from out of town, so their spending represents in inflow of money to the 
region. Furthermore, mega-events can serve to advertise the city to national or 
international markets, and especially in the wake of Hurricane Katrina might serve as an 
indicator that the city is open for business.  
 
V.  The “Feel Good” Legacy of Professional Sports in Post-Katrina New Orleans 
Although the direct economic impact of the return of professional sports to New 
Orleans was likely small, a strong case can be made for sports having an important 
psychological impact. While much of New Orleans’ Lower 9th Ward remained a tangle of 
rubble and destroyed houses more than one year after Katrina, the Superdome reopened 
for the 2006 NFL season. The restoration of the Superdome and the return of the Saints 
had clear symbolic significance. In fact, the Saints’ return to New Orleans on September 
25, 2006, received significant national attention. The game was nationally televised on 
Monday Night Football and featured musical performances by U2 and Green Day before 
the game. The team scored their first points in their home city with a dramatic blocked 
punt in the first quarter. That play is immortalized in a large statue outside the stadium 
erected in 2012 and named “Rebirth”. The statue is said to be “symbolic of New Orleans’ 
resilience in the face of disaster.” (Associated Press, 2012) 
Those residents who returned to the city embraced the team by purchasing a 
record number of season tickets for the 2006 season. In fact, in their return to the 
Superdome following Katrina, season ticket holders purchased every available regular 
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season ticket for the first time in the history of the franchise. (Associated Press, 2006) 
The fact that the Saints played for the National Football Conference title in January of 
2007, the best performance in the history of the team to that point, further cemented the 
team in the hearts of the city’s residents. And in the decade that followed, the fan base 
remained solid, selling out every home game, and the waitlist for season tickets grew to 
60,000. Their success at the box office was helped in large part by the success of team. In 
the 39 years prior to Katrina, the Saints had a 0.386 win percentage and had won only 
one playoff game in their history. In the 12 season since returning to New Orleans, a 
period coinciding with the acquisition of future Hall of Fame quarterback Drew Brees, 
the team has amassed a 0.583 win percentage and 6 playoff wins including their only 
Super Bowl Championship in 2010.  
The fans’ response, however, failed to impress the Saints owner who noted that, 
“You haven’t seen the total commitment yet. No National Football League team can live 
on tickets alone… The next big step is that the business community needs to step up.” 
(Corbett, 2006) Limited by the small number of large corporations in the city and the 
redevelopment priorities faced by the city’s small businesses, 40% of the Superdome’s 
luxury suites remained unsold as of May 2006. As luxury suites are not part of the 
league’s revenue sharing deal, they provide significant profits to a team’s owner. The fact 
that Tom Benson was unsatisfied with the millions spent on the first wave of stadium 
repairs and improvements entirely paid for by others and with record season ticket 
purchases by local residents boded ill for the Saints’ long-term future in New Orleans. 
Indeed, as noted previously, it took another nearly $400 million in tax subsidies and 
 23
another round of taxpayer financed improvements to the Superdome to convince Benson 
to commit the team to New Orleans through 2025. (Alexander 2013) 
It remains to be seen whether the team will be able to maintain its extraordinary 
level of fan interest in such a small market if the team’s fortunes on the field wane. And 
as noted by Benson, relatively high revenues are the key to keeping teams, but that 
requires more than ticket sales. Even with strong attendance and generous revenue 
sharing from the league, the team only ranks in the middle of NFL franchises in terms of 
annual revenue and is near the bottom in franchise valuation. (Forbes, 2017) 
While the majority of the media attention focused on the return of the Saints to 
the city, New Orleans’ other franchises experienced changes in the wake of Katrina. The 
NBA’s New Orleans Hornets, renamed the Pelicans in honor of Louisiana’s state bird in 
2013, were relatively new to the city when Katrina hit, having arrived in only 2002 after 
relocating from Charlotte. Prior to the arrival of the Hornet, New Orleans had been 
without an NBA team since 1979 when the New Orleans Jazz moved to Utah after 
suffering financial difficulties in Louisiana. Prior to Katrina, the Hornets, like the Jazz 
before them struggled financially. They were dead last in attendance in the league during 
the 2004-05 season. 
While not as badly damaged as the Superdome, the New Orleans Arena, built in 
1999 and currently named the Smoothie King Center, was also unusable in the wake of 
Hurricane Katrina necessitating a change in venue for the Hornets. An attempt to move 
the team to Baton Rouge was scuttled because the sports arenas in Baton Rouge were 
commandeered for coordinating relief efforts for New Orleans. Instead, the team was 
officially renamed the Oklahoma City/New Orleans Hornets for 2005-06 and 2006-07 
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NBA seasons, and they played 35 of 41 home games in Oklahoma during each of those 
seasons. Only 6 games were played in Louisiana in the first season, with the team 
splitting time between Baton Rouge and New Orleans. On March 8, 2006, the Hornets 
became the first professional team to play in New Orleans following the disaster. Six 
games were played in New Orleans in the 2006-07 season.  
Given the substantial increase in attendance that the team experienced in 
Oklahoma City, it was somewhat surprising that the NBA and the Hornets’ owner George 
Shinn committed to keep the team in New Orleans. In retrospect, it appears that the 
decision to the return the franchise to New Orleans was based more on Shinn’s troubled 
personal history than any sound financial decision-making. By December 2010, without 
the means to cover the continuing losses of the team and unable to find another buyer, 
Shinn sold the franchise to the league. (Belson and Beck, 2010) Tom Benson, owner of 
the Saints, later purchased the team. The team has languished in the bottom quarter of the 
league in attendance since their return to the city. 
Minor league franchise experienced the same sort of temporary boost in 
attendance due to civic pride as witnessed by the Saints. The New Orleans VooDoo, an 
Arena Football team owned by Benson, suspended play for the 2006 season due to the 
damage to the New Orleans Arena. When the team returned in 2007, it led the league in 
attendance and posted one of the highest average attendance marks in the history of the 
league. However, the financial success was short-lived. After the 2008 season, Benson 
announced that the VooDoo were ceasing operations, and the entire league declared 
bankruptcy within a year.  
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The New Orleans Zephyrs (now known as the New Orleans Baby Cakes), the 
city’s AAA Minor League Baseball team, suffered only moderate damage to its playing 
facilities and was able to open its 2006 season at home. Taxpayer funded repairs cost $21 
million, and the team supplemented this figure by another $5 million to add new 
amenities including 16 luxury suites, a swimming pool, and two hot tubs. The stadium 
also hosted the Tulane University baseball team in 2006 and 2007 as the university’s 
athletic facilities suffered more extensive damage. Like many of the other local sports 
franchises, the team did experience a bump in attendance in its first year back with a 
roughly 10% increase in fans during the 2006 season over the previous season (which had 
ended just a few days before Katrina made landfall).  Over the course of the next decade, 
attendance remained relatively stable for the team at roughly the same level the franchise 
had experienced prior to Katrina but one-third below the peak the team reached 
immediately after opening their new ballpark in 1997.  
Professional sports teams were not the only organizations to engage in sports-
related investment following Hurricane Katrina. Tulane University, for example, engaged 
in a significant reconstruction program for its athletic complexes as part of its $250 
million campus-wide rehabilitation effort following the hurricane (Henderson, 2006).  
Tulane, unlike the Saints, has a huge financial commitment in its campus, and it is 
motivated to recoup its past investment. Division 1 intercollegiate sports serve as a 
recruitment tool for both athletes and prospective students as the school attempts to 
rebuild its student body.  
Apart from permanent sports franchises, mega-events also contributed to the 
redevelopment of the city. The country’s major sports leagues were eager to appear as 
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helpful contributors to the reconstruction of New Orleans, and the city received favorable 
treatment in the awarding of major events to the city. The NBA played the 2008 All-Star 
Game in the city. The College Football National Championship games were played at the 
Superdome in 2007 and 2012 and will return in 2020. The NCAA Men’s Basketball Final 
Four was played in the city in 2012 and will return in 2022, and the Women’s Final Four 
was played at the New Orleans Arena in 2013. The nation’s biggest sporting event, the 
Super Bowl, took place in New Orleans in 2013 although the event was marred by a 34-
minute power outage during the middle of the game. Of course, this type of incident 
demonstrates the importance of properly maintaining general infrastructure, investments 
that can often take a back seat to spending on sports infrastructure and the subsidies to the 
owners of sports franchises in order to convince them to keep their teams in an otherwise 
unattractive city, economically.  
 
VIII. Conclusions and Policy Implications     
 Hurricane Katrina induced a massive outflow of residents and businesses from the 
city of New Orleans.  The city’s two major professional sports teams, the NFL Saints and 
NBA Hornets were among the businesses that had to leave due to the extensive damage 
to their infrastructure. The capital costs and other financial commitments necessary to 
encourage the return of the Saints and the Hornets for the long term were substantial.  
The images of the NFL and NBA would have been damaged if the Saints and Hornets 
had not at least make cameo appearances, but in the longer term, the teams and their 
leagues demanded greater revenue streams than can be generated in their current 
facilities. The fact that New Orleans and the State of Louisiana were already directly 
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subsidizing the teams indicates that pre-Katrina the teams were not generating revenues 
in their venues that allowed them to be financially competitive in their leagues.  This 
paper has concluded that it may have been financially ill-advised in the post-Katrina 
world to direct substantial funds at refurbishing and upgrading the Superdome and New 
Orleans arena or to continue to directly subsidize the franchises specifically to make the 
teams financially competitive.  
Capital expenditures on the Superdome supplant capital expenditures on housing, 
schooling, and other middle class amenities that will bring the middle class back, and the 
reconstruction of the Superdome in the short run should have been undertaken only after 
spending on housing and other infrastructure repairs. Furthermore, restoration efforts for 
the Superdome and New Orleans Arena should not necessarily be directed towards 
amenities that provide the highest revenues for sports franchises, but instead providing a 
multipurpose facility for the general tourist trade. Providing physical accommodation for 
professional sports teams did not advance the economics interests of New Orleans in the 
short term.  Having done so exacerbated the economic problems that existed in the 
aftermath of the storm. 
One odd consequence of Katrina is that it may well have made it virtually 
impossible for the Saints to leave New Orleans in the short term, while at the same time 
requiring substantial public investment to provide accommodations in order to keep the 
team in the long-run. The opportunity costs for the funds necessary to rebuild the sports 
infrastructure have never been higher, but the political demand for demonstrable recovery 
from Katrina to include the highly symbolic reconstruction of sports facilities had sharply 
shifted the demand for their restoration to the right.  The fact that a year after the storm, a 
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bond issue for $294 million to refurbish the Superdome was sold with relatively little 
resistance provided striking testimony to this assertion.  Tom Benson and the Saints have 
benefited from financial transfers from the City of New Orleans and the NFL.  These 
transfers very likely would have been strongly contested and may not have occurred at all 
in the absence of the storm.    
Cities in general should be mindful of the fact that subsidies for professional 
sports teams eliminate the financial incentives teams would have to remain in the 
community following a natural or manmade disaster.  Businesses that have risked their 
own capital and built infrastructure have a financial stake in their host community, but 
the Saints and Hornets, as well as most professional sports teams in the United States, 
have few such ties to their local communities. Paradoxically, cities have contributed in a 
very substantial way to the incentive for teams to abandon a city in the face of a disaster 
on the scale of Katrina.  The owner of the New Orleans Saints was making his way out of 
New Orleans before Katrina, and the storm probably has increased his perception of risk 
and diminished his long-term financial prospects in New Orleans to a point that it is not 
in his financial interest to stay there without the significant public subsidies that the city 
has provided.  
 New Orleans will be rebuilt at the grassroots home by home and business by 
business.  Locational fundamentals may well lead to the restoration of New Orleans long 
term.  The rate at which the city was resettled and restored affected the ability of the NFL 
Saints and NBA Hornets to generate revenues that encouraged them to remain in the 
community.  The Saints and the Hornets have invested little in infrastructure, and are 
motivated in large part by the size of future revenue streams in New Orleans relative to 
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other cities that would like to host them.  The City of New Orleans, on the other hand, 
has invested substantially in infrastructure for the teams, and, as a first step found it 
necessary to invest further in that infrastructure necessary to encourage the teams to stay.  
That stay would have been short-lived in the absence of the return of the middle class so 
necessary to support the team and give the city any chance to recoup its infrastructure 
investment. To achieve this end, the order of capital expenditures in New Orleans should 
have been levees, housing, middle class amenities, infrastructure for nonresident 
businesses, and lastly those industries that cater to the entertainment needs of the middle 
class. 
The role of sports in the economic recovery of the city is dubious aside from 
serving as a symbol that the city remains vital.  The repair of the Superdome and the New 
Orleans Arena was an expensive tease in that regard.  The investment in sports 
infrastructure did little to provide what was needed for the community to recover from 
the storm.  Sports and the hosting of mega-events may actually undermine longer-term 
recovery through deflecting capital spending from where it is needed most and crowding 
out those workers and residents who are involved in the essential rebuilding process.  
Sport may have provided a pleasant recreational amenity to returning residents, but it is 
reasonable to ask whether the economic interests of the sport elites, out of financial and 
economic development necessity, should have taken a seat on the bench in the interest of 
the greater good. 
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Table 1:  Summary Statistics for U.S. Metropolitan Areas (2004) 
 
Metropolitan Area Population Rank Per Capita Income Rank NFL NBA NHL MLB MLS Total 
New York-Newark  22,662,795   1   44,959   2  2 2 3 2 1 10 
Los Angeles-Riverside  17,284,575   2   35,305   18  0 2 2 2 2 8 
Chicago  9,629,435   3   38,389   11  1 1 1 2 1 6 
Washington-Baltimore  8,470,401   4   44,836   3  2 1 1 2 1 7 
Boston-Providence  7,760,397   5   42,457   4  1 1 1 1 1 5 
San Jose-SF-Oakland  7,753,167   6   48,091   1  2 1 1 2 0 6 
Philadelphia  6,852,767   7   39,365   9  1 1 1 1 0 4 
Dallas-Fort Worth  6,074,414   8   33,923   23  1 1 1 1 1 5 
Miami-Fort Lauderdale  5,868,202   9   37,808   12  1 1 1 1 0 4 
Detroit-Warren  5,480,176   10   35,374   17  1 1 1 1 0 4 
Houston  5,321,109   11   35,124   19  1 1 0 1 1 4 
Atlanta  5,220,858   12   35,714   15  1 1 1 1 0 4 
Seattle-Tacoma  3,935,449   13   41,338   6  1 1 0 1 0 3 
Phoenix  3,637,332   14   32,220   39  1 1 1 1 0 4 
Cleveland-Akron  3,564,308   15   33,087   32  1 1 0 1 0 3 
Minneapolis-St. Paul  3,490,160   16   40,374   7  1 1 1 1 0 4 
San Diego  2,930,007   17   40,314   8  1 0 0 1 0 2 
St. Louis  2,822,926   18   35,701   16  1 0 1 1 0 3 
Denver  2,799,868   19   39,012   10  1 1 1 1 1 5 
Pittsburgh  2,699,639   20   33,533   27  1 0 1 1 0 3 
Portland, OR  2,685,494   21   33,045   33  0 1 0 0 0 1 
Tampa-St. Petersburg  2,587,771   22   33,034   34  1 0 1 1 0 3 
Orlando  2,488,765   23   29,743   45  0 1 0 0 0 1 
Sacramento  2,255,401   24   35,912   14  0 1 0 0 0 1 
Kansas City  2,213,656   25   32,380   37  1 0 0 1 1 3 
Columbus  2,170,450   26   32,413   36  0 0 1 0 1 2 
Indianapolis  2,123,265   27   33,639   26  1 1 0 0 0 2 
Cincinnati  2,101,112   28   34,970   21  1 0 0 1 0 2 
Charlotte  2,035,782   29   33,119   31  1 1 0 0 0 2 
Salt Lake City-Provo  1,981,051   30   27,901   48  0 1 0 0 1 2 
Milwaukee  1,979,716   31   35,921   13  0 1 0 1 0 2 
Las Vegas  1,880,581   32   33,688   25  0 0 0 0 0 0 
San Antonio  1,857,602   33   29,683   46  0 1 0 0 0 1 
Virginia Beach-Norfolk  1,736,907   34   33,862   24  0 0 0 0 0 0 
Raleigh-Durham  1,606,502   35   34,991   20  0 0 1 0 0 1 
Nashville  1,587,444   36   34,399   22  1 0 1 0 0 2 
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New Orleans  1,578,179   37   29,043   47  1 1 0 0 0 2 
Greensboro-Winston-Salem  1,472,314   38   30,731   43  0 0 0 0 0 0 
Hartford  1,451,200   39   41,348   5  0 0 0 0 0 0 
Austin  1,410,058   40   33,347   28  0 0 0 0 0 0 
Louisville  1,371,885   41   32,121   40  0 0 0 0 0 0 
Grand Rapids  1,355,200   42   30,489   44  0 0 0 0 0 0 
Jacksonville  1,341,793   43   33,268   30  1 0 0 0 0 1 
Birmingham  1,289,938   44   32,297   38  0 0 0 0 0 0 
Memphis  1,287,853   45   32,933   35  0 1 0 0 0 1 
Greenville, SC  1,262,050   46   27,394   49  0 0 0 0 0 0 
Buffalo  1,238,934   47   31,002   42  1 0 1 0 0 2 
Oklahoma City  1,212,596   48   31,067   41  0 0 0 0 0 0 
Green Bay  294,570   NA   33,329   29  1 0 0 0 0 1 
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Table 2:  Summary Statistics for U.S. Metropolitan Areas (2018) 
Metropolitan Area Population Rank Change Per Capita Income Rank NFL NBA NHL MLB MLS Total 
New York-Newark 23,689,255 1 - 65,960 2 2 2 3 2 2 11 
Los Angeles-Riverside 18,688,022 2 - 52,166 13 2 2 2 2 2 10 
Chicago 9,882,634 3 - 55,005 11 1 1 1 2 1 6 
Washington-Baltimore 9,665,892 4 - 62,317 4 2 1 1 2 1 7 
San Jose-SF-Oakland 8,751,807 5 +1 76,988 1 2 1 1 2 1 7 
Boston-Providence 8,176,376 6 -1 62,790 3 1 1 1 1 1 5 
Dallas-Fort Worth 7,673,305 7 +1 50,344 18 1 1 1 1 1 5 
Philadelphia 7,179,357 8 -1 56,314 8 1 1 1 1 1 5 
Houston 6,972,374 9 +2 51,442 15 1 1 0 1 1 4 
Miami-Fort Lauderdale 6,723,472 10 -1 52,206 12 1 1 1 1 0 4 
Atlanta 6,451,262 11 +1 46,204 31 1 1 0 1 1 4 
Detroit-Warren 5,318,653 12 -2 47,758 26 1 1 1 1 0 4 
Seattle-Tacoma 4,684,516 13 - 61,104 5 1 0 0 1 1 3 
Phoenix 4,661,537 14 - 42,218 45 1 1 1 1 0 4 
Minneapolis-St. Paul 3,894,820 15 +1 55,486 9 1 1 1 1 1 5 
Cleveland-Akron 3,483,311 16 -1 46,444 29 1 1 0 1 0 3 
Denver 3,470,235 17 +2 56,319 7 1 1 1 1 1 5 
San Diego 3,317,749 18 -1 55,168 10 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Orlando 3,202,927 19 +4 39,929 48 0 1 0 0 1 2 
Portland, OR 3,160,488 20 +1 47,845 25 0 1 0 0 1 2 
Tampa-St. Petersburg 3,032,171 21 +1 43,807 41 1 0 1 1 0 3 
St. Louis 2,911,769 22 -4 48,950 21 0 0 1 1 0 2 
Pittsburgh 2,635,228 23 -3 49,633 19 1 0 1 1 0 3 
Charlotte 2,632,249 24 +5 45,980 32 1 1 0 0 0 2 
Sacramento 2,567,451 25 -1 50,829 17 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Salt Lake City-Provo 2,514,748 26 +4 42,886 44 0 1 0 0 1 2 
Kansas City 2,446,396 27 -2 46,911 27 1 0 0 1 1 3 
Columbus 2,443,402 28 -2 45,904 34 0 0 1 0 1 2 
San Antonio 2,429,609 29 +4 44,284 38 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Las Vegas 2,404,336 30 +2 41,120 46 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Indianapolis 2,386,199 31 -4 47,956 23 1 1 0 0 0 2 
Cincinnati 2,224,231 32 -4 48,429 22 1 0 0 1 0 2 
Raleigh-Durham 2,156,253 33 +2 47,885 24 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Austin 2,056,405 34 +6 51,566 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Milwaukee 2,043,274 35 -4 49,548 20 0 1 0 1 0 2 
Nashville 1,987,778 36 - 51,270 16 1 0 1 0 0 2 
Virginia Beach-Norfolk 1,830,629 37 -3 46,693 28 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Greensboro-Winston-
Salem 1,650,019 38 
- 40,112 47 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Jacksonville 1,603,497 39 +4 44,325 37 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Louisville 1,510,945 40 +1 44,525 36 0 0 0 0 0 0 
New Orleans 1,501,213 41 -4 45,245 35 1 1 0 0 0 2 
Hartford 1,476,637 42 -3 58,346 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Oklahoma City 1,445,501 43 +5 44,172 39 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Grand Rapids 1,443,508 44 -2 43,570 42 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Greenville, SC 1,442,117 45 +1 38,977 49 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Memphis 1,369,038 46 -1 43,175 43 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Birmingham 1,361,299 47 -3 44,037 40 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Buffalo 1,210,481 48 -1 45,933 33 1 0 1 0 0 2 
Green Bay 318,236 NA NA 46,362 30 1 0 0 0 0 1 
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Table 3: Aggregate Measures of the Fraction of the Economic Activity   
for Selected Cities and the United States Represented by  
“Leisure and Hospitality” (NAICS 7) for 2004 
 
Geographic 
Area/Statistic 
NAICS 7 
Employees as a % 
of Total Area 
Employees  
NAICS 7 
Annual Payroll as a 
% of Total Area 
Payroll 
NAICS 7 
Establishments as a 
% of Total Area 
Establishments 
Atlanta 9.67 3.93 7.70 
Charlotte 9.34 3.99 7.82 
Greenville 9.94 3.62 8.83 
Houston 9.14 3.36 7.72 
Memphis 11.22 5.58 7.66 
Miami 10.75 5.51 7.22 
New Orleans 13.93 7.22 9.74 
Orlando 19.39 11.93 8.19 
Tampa 9.42 4.62 7.78 
United States 9.64 4.07 8.10 
Atlanta 9.67 3.93 7.70 
Source:  https://www.bls.gov/cew/ 
 
MSA, quarterly census of employment 
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Table 4: Aggregate Measures of the Fraction of the Economic Activity   
for Selected Cities and the United States Represented by  
“Leisure and Hospitality” (NAICS 7) for 2017 
 
Geographic 
Area/Statistic 
NAICS 7 
Employees as a % 
of Total Area 
Employees  
NAICS 7 
Annual Payroll as a 
% of Total Area 
Payroll 
NAICS 7 
Establishments as a 
% of Total Area 
Establishments 
Atlanta 11.18 4.11 8.86 
Charlotte 11.72 4.91 9.26 
Greenville 11.15 4.14 10.37 
Houston 10.85 3.78 8.88 
Memphis 11.14 4.87 10.31 
Miami 12.70 6.80 7.54 
New Orleans 16.30 8.51 11.38 
Orlando 21.36 12.52 9.36 
Tampa 12.03 5.63 8.64 
United States 11.05 4.62 8.51 
Atlanta 11.18 4.11 8.86 
Source:  https://www.bls.gov/cew/ 
 
MSA, quarterly census of employment 
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Table 5: Aggregate Measures of the Fraction of New Orleans Economic Activity in 
Total Represented by Spectator Sports for 2004 and 2017 
 
2004 
Ratio/NAICS 
number NAICS 71 NAICS 711 NAICS 7112 NAICS 72 
Industry 
Employees/New 
Orleans Total 
2.33% 
(1.43%) 
0.43% 
(.29%) 
0.13% 
(.10%) 
11.60% 
(10.52%) 
Annual Industry 
Payroll/New 
Orleans Total 
2.20% 
(1.01%) 
1.00% 
(.47%) 
0.83% 
(.22%) 
5.03% 
(5.54%) 
Industry 
Establishments/New 
Orleans Total 
1.42% 
(1.38%) 
0.51% 
(.50%) 
0.11% 
(.07%) 
8.32% 
(8.33%) 
   2017 
Ratio/NAICS 
number NAICS 71 NAICS 711 NAICS 7112 NAICS 72 
Industry 
Employees/New 
Orleans Total 
2.31% 
(1.59%) 
0.76% 
(.34%) 
N/A 
(.10%) 
13.99% 
(9.45%) 
Annual Industry 
Payroll/New 
Orleans Total 
2.36% 
(1.09%) 
1.62% 
(.55%) 
N/A 
(.27%) 
6.15% 
(3.54%) 
Industry 
Establishments/New 
Orleans Total 
1.75% 
(1.43%) 
0.71% 
(.55%) 
0.10% 
(.06%) 
9.64% 
(7.08%) 
 
NAICS 71: Arts, entertainment, and recreation 
NAICS 711: Performing arts and spectator sports 
NAICS 7112: Spectator sports 
NAICS 72: Accommodation and food services 
U.S. percentages given in parentheses. (U.S.) 
 
Source: https://www.bls.gov/cew/ 
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Table 6:  Comparing the Pre- and Post-Katrina Economies for the New 
Orleans MSA 
 
Statistic/Date July 2005 
 
July 2006 July 2017 
MSA Population 1,313,787 1,024,678 1,275,762 
Unemployment Rate [Louisiana = 5.6%] New 
Orleans = 6.1% (United 
States = 5.0%) 
[Louisiana = 4.2%] New 
Orleans = 4.9% (United 
States = 4.7%) 
[Louisiana = 6.1%] New 
Orleans = 5.5% (United 
States = 4.3%) 
Labor Force Size 645,907 507,621 (Down 21.4% 
from July 2005) 
601,519 (Down 6.9% 
from July 2005) 
Population Employed in 
the Transportation and 
Trade Sector 
122,300 105,200 (Down 14.0% 
from July 2005) 
112,800 (Down 7.8% 
from July 2005) 
Population Employed in 
the Hospitality and 
Leisure Sector 
86,200 60,600 (Down 29.7% 
from July 2005) 
88,700 (Down 2.9% 
from July 2005) 
Public Transportation:  
% of the System 
Operational 
100% 17% 100% 
Number of Workers 
Employed by 
Government  
103,100 or 16.0% of the 
labor force for 
government at all levels; 
15,700 for the federal 
government or 2.4% 
73,600 or 14.5% of the 
labor force for 
government at all levels; 
12,400 for the federal 
government or 2.4% 
69,800 or 11.6% of the 
labor force for 
government at all levels; 
12,700 for the federal 
government or 2.1% 
Number of Open Hotels 142 116 (Down 18% from 
July 2005) 
n.a. 
Open Retail Food 
Establishments 
100% 44% 100% 
Number of Passengers 
Arriving at the New 
Orleans Airport 
438,578 282,137 (Down 35.7% 
from July 2005) 
525,822 (Up 19.9% 
from July 2005) 
Source:  Greater New Orleans Community Data Center, The Katrina Index, February 15, 
2007, www.gnocdc.org.  Accessed on March 3, 2007. 
aJanuary 2006 statistic.  Note the metropolitan population for New Orleans fell by 29.2 
percent from July 2005 to January 2006. 
 
 
